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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

TIM THEMY,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.
SEAGULL ENTERPRISES, INC.,
a Utah Corporation, SHIRLEY
K. WATSON, UNITED BANK, a
Utah Corporation, ZIONS FIRST
NATIONAL BANK and MURRAY
BROADCASTING COMPANY, . INC.,
Defendants-Appellants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.
15641

)
)
)

)
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Summary Judgment granted by
the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and entered
in the above entitled matter on the 2nd day of November, 1977.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Seagull Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation,
hereinafter referred to as "Seagull", Shirley K. Waton, hereinafter
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referred to as "Watson", and Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc.
hereinafter referred to as "MBC", seek a reversal of the
SUillIIlary Judgment and a remand of the above entitled matter to
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah for a full trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February of 1974, Mr. Jay Gardner, hereinafter
referred to as "Gardner", as the General Manager of radio star:
K.."10R, hereinafter referred to as the "Station", located in Sal:
Lake County, Utah, met in California with Mr. Charles R.

S~dle:

to discuss the possible acquisition by Mr. Sadler of certain
-

------------Aft~~r~ -Sadler 1 s-initia:

pr op er ties of the Station (R. 296).

indication of interest to Gardner, a meeting was arranged bee:<
Mr. Sadler and the owner of the station properties, Mr. 0. J.

Wilkinson (R.297).
After the proposed purchase negotiations had proceedec
to a point where the acquisition seemed imminent, in March of
1974, Seagull Enterprises, Inc., hereinafter "Seagull" was
incorporated to acquire from Mr. O. J. Wilkinson certain real
property and broadcast equipment together with the Federal
Co=unication Colillllission broadcasting license and operate the
Station (R. 297).

Mr. Sadler was president and majority
··~

stock~.

· d nt an:

of Seagull, and Mr. Gardner was to serve as vice presi e
~-----------......._

general manager (R.294, 295).
On the 26th day of June, 1974, two agreements were
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executed by and between O.J.Wilkinson, d/b/a KMOR Radio
and Seagull. The first Purchase Agreement related to certain
real property located in Salt Lake County and provided for a
purchase price of $250,000.00 with a $5,000.00 down payment to
be paid at the time the Federal Communications Commission, hereinafter "Commission", approved the transfer of the broadcasting
license from Mr. Wilkinson to Seagull with the balance of
$245,000.00 to be paid in monthly installments of $2,484.96 commencing the first day of the second month following said Commission approval. (R.9-14). The other Purchase Agreement related to
the broadcasting license identified as FCC File No. BR2198,
together with certain broadcasting equipment and provided for a
total consideration of $250,000.00 with $74,000.00 to be placed
in escrow and payable to the seller fifteen days after Commission
approval of the agreement, and transfer of the broadcasting license
from Mr. O.J. Wilkinson to Seagull with the balance of $176,000.00
to be paid in monthly installments of $1,785.11 commencing on the
first day of the sixth month following said Commission approval.
(R. 15-21).
An application for approval of the assignment and transfer
of the broadcast license from Mr. O.J. Wilkinson to Seagull
was prepared and filed with the Commission and, on December 13,
1974, the Commission approved the transfer (R. 301) whereupon
Seagull paid to Mr.

Q.

J. lvilkinson the sum of $ 5, 000. 00

as required by the Purchase Agreement relating to the real property
and the sum of $74,000.00 that was being held in escrow pending
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Commission approval was released from and pajd by the escrow
to Mr. Wilkinson (R.301).
Because of certain financial difficulties, Seagull
was unable to comply with the monthly installment payment
provisions of either agreement and on the 4th day of September,
1975, Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson caused to be served on Gardner two
documents, each entitled Notice, whereby Mr. Wilkinson sought

t

declare a forfeiture by Seagull in and to both agreements (R.31
R. 358-362).

Shortly thereafter, Gardner left the station and

took employment in Wyoming (R. 310).

However, in January of 19"

Gardner had several telephone conversations with both Mr. Wilk:
and Mr. Sadler, each of whom assured Gardner that Seagull was
going forward and that the contractural obligations would be
met (R. 310).

Based on these assurances and representations,

Gardner returned as general manager of radio station KMOR on
January 29, 1976 (R.311).
Financial problems continued to plague Seagull and in
February, March and April of 1976, Mr. Sadler, for and on beha:
of Seagull, attempted to negotiate a transfer of the broadcast
license from Seagull to the respondent herein Mr. Tim Themy.
The transfer price was to be $13,000.00 but the negotiations
were never consummated (R.332).
Meanwhile, on March 1, 1976, Mr. O. J. Wilkinson exec•;
a promissory note in favor of Zions First National Bank
amount of $250,000.00 (R.92).

. thi

in

To secure payment t h ereo f · Mr

Wilkinson signed and delivered to Z]_. ons Fi" rs t National Bank
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Deed of Trust in and to the same real property subject to the
Wilkinson-Seagull Purchase Agreement together with an Assignment
of Wilkinson's seller's interest in said Purchase Agreement
(R.48,49).

It may be noted that the broadcasting equipment

conveyed by Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson to Seagull had been pledged as
security to United Bank to secure a loan in the amount of
$90,000.00 which $90,000.00 was distributed as follows:

$5,000.00

to Mr. Wilkinson as down payment for the real property, $74,000.00
distributed by United Bank, as escrow, to Mr. Wilkinson on the
approval of the Cormnission of the transfer of the broadcast
license from Mr. Wilkinson to Seagull, and the amount of $11,000.00
as operating capital for Seagull (R.302).

Both Mr. Sadler and

Gardner personally guaranteed the United Bank loan to Seagull
(R.

302) .
On or about the 26th day of May, 1976, Mr. Wilkinson

purportedly assigned his seller's interest in each of the
agreements by and between Mr. Wilkinson and Seagull to the
respondent herein, Mr. Tim Themy.
Thereafter, Seagull transferred and assigned to Shirley
K. Watson d/b/a Murray Broadcasting Company, the broadcasting
equipment together with the subject broadcasting license.
appropriate assignment

An

application was submitted to the

Conrrnission and accepted for filing by the Cormnission on July 9,
1976.

Pursuant to 47 USCA Section 309 (b) (1), an a·pplication

may not be granted earlier than thirty (30) days following the
issuance of public notice of the acceptance of the C0Im11ission
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of the application for filing.

This allows an interested

party thirty (30) days in which to file objections to the
proposed transfer or assignment.

Respondent herein, Mr. Tim

Themy, did file a Petition to Deny the assignment on November
16, 1976, and although the petition was not timely filed,
respondent's pleading was treated by the Commission as an ink
objection to the application and considered on its merits (R.1!
265).

Notwithstanding respondent's objections, the assignment

of the subject broadcasting license from Seagull to Shirley K.
Watson d/b I a Murray Broadcasting Company was approved by the
Cormnission on the 4th day of March, 1977 (R.267, 267A).
Subsequently, Shirley K. Watson d/b/ a Murray Broadcast:
Company transferred the broadcasting equipment and assigned t'.'.!
subject broadcasting license to Murray Broadcasting Company,!:
This assignment of the broadcasting license was approved by
the Commission on the 14th day of June, 1977 (R.266).
An application was submitted to the Commission on the
31st day of May, 1977, for authority to relocate the broadcasc:
site of the station from the facilities originally conveyed bv
'.I

Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson to Seagull to the station's present broacc,
site located at 4874 South State Street, Murray, Utah.

Temper'

authority for the relocation was granted by the Commission on
the 1st day of July, 1977.
rantei
On the 15th day of August, 1977, authority was g
he station f::
by the Commission to change the call letters Of t
Broadcast:·
KMOR to KPRQ and the broadcasting license of Murray
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Company, Inc., was renewed by the Commission for a three year
period on the 13th day of January, 1978.
Presently, Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. operates
radio station KPRQ pursuant to a valid license duly approved
and renewed by the Commission on a relocated broadcasting site
and with independently obtained broadcasting equipment, and
neither the real property nor the broadcast equipment originally
conveyed by Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson to Seagull is occupied or utilized
by Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc.

Because of the nature of this proceeding, to wit: an
appeal from the grant of a Summary Judgment, appellants respectfully
submit that a brief outline of the pleadings would be beneficial
to this Court.

Respondent's Verified Complaint naming Seagull,

Shirley K. Watson and United Bank, a Utah Corporation as party
defendants, was initially filed on the 1st day of October, 1976
(R.2-21).

At that time, respondent also sought the appointment

of a receiver (R.22).

Answers to the Verified Complaint were

duly filed by the defendants United Bank (R.32,33), Shirley K.
Watson (R.36,37) and Seagull (R.40,41).

Additionally, a Motion

to Intervene and Answer was filed by Zions First National Bank
(R.42-49) and this motion was granted on the 24th day of February,
1977 (R. 55).

Pursuant to the leave of court granted on the 21st day
of July, 1977 (R.84), respondent filed an Amended Complaint naming
Seagull, Shirley K. Watson, United Bank, Zions First National
Bank and Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc., as party defendants
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(R. 70-80).

By his Amended Complaint, respondent sought a

judgment of forfeiture of Seagull and its successors in interes
in and to the agreement relating to the real property (R. 72) o:
in the al terna ti ve, for a judgment treating the Agreement, as
a note and mortgage with foreclosure thereof (R. 73, 74).

With

respect to the Agreement relating to the broadcasting equipment
and broadcasting license, respondent sought a declaratory judge:
that plaintiff was the equitable owner of the broadcasting

eq~'1

and license (R. 75), or, in the alte1:native, for a judgment trq
the Agreement relating to the broadcasting equipment: and licer'
as a note and mortgage with foreclosure againft the same (R.76
Additionally, plaintiff claimed a security interest in the
broadcast equipment and license and, after alleging a delinque
balance of $45,736.98, sought possession thereof pursuant to
Article 9 of the Utah Cormnercial Code (R. 77).

Finally, respor:

sought relief pursuant to the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(R.79).
Answers to respondent's Amended Complaint were filed
by the defendants Shirley K. Watson ancl Murray Broadcasting cc:t
Inc.

(R.87-90), Zions First National Bank (R.91-94), Seagull

(R.99-101), and United Bank (R.130-133).
On the 21st day of September, 1977, respondent fileda
arguei
.
Motion for Surmnary Judgment (R.134) with the same b eing
and taken under advisement by the Court on the 3rd day of ocr::
f October .
By Memorandum Decision under d ate o
for 51Jl]JlPO:
1977 (R.158), the Court granted respondent's Motion

1977 (R.136).
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Judgment and on the 2nd day of November, 1977, a formal
Summary Judgment was entered (172,173).
Appellants Seagull, Shirley K. Watson and Murray
Broadcasting Company, Inc., petitioned the lower Court for a
reformation of the Suilll!lary Judgment (R.174-178; R.181,182), and
on the 5th day of January, 1978, an Order Denying Petition to
Reform Memorandum Decision and SUilllllary Judgment was entered
(R.191-193).
The Notice of Appeal herein was filed on the 24th day
of January, 1978 (R.202,203), and on the 6th day of March, 1978,
respondent's Motion to Dismiss appellants' appeal was denied.
Pursuant to leave of this Court granted April 17, 1978,
appellants filed an Amended Notice of Appeal and an Amended
Designation of Record on Appeal to include that certain Order
Appointing Receiver Or In The Alternative, Setting Supersedeas
Bond, entered in the above entitled matter on or about the 17th
day of Mar ch , 1 9 7 8 ( R .
On the 17th day of April, 1978, this Court continued
in force and effect the stay against the Order Appointing Receiver
Or In The Alternative, Setting Supersedeas Bond, conditioned on
the lower court fixing an appropriate supersedeas bond.

The

hearing before the lower Court to establish an appropriate
supersedeas bond is pending at the present time.

However, the

propriety of the lower Court's action in appointing a receiver
with full authority to take possession of the real and personal
property and the broadcasting license and sell or transfer the
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same together with the authority of the receiver to manage
radio station KPRQ remain within the scope of this appeal
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE EXISTED
GENUINE DISPUTES AS TO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT
A.

A GENUINE DISPUTE EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES
AS TO WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS THE SUCCESSOR IN
INTEREST OF MR. 0. J. WILKINSON IN AND TO THE
TWO AGREEMENTS THAT CONSTITUTED THE SUBJECT MATTH
OF RESPONDENT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT.

It is elementary that, "Rule 56, U.R.C.P., should not:'
u~:ed where there are issues of fact in dispute".

Hatch vs.

Sugarhouse Finance Company, 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P2d 758 (1967)
at 20 Utch 2d 157.
In Holbrook Company vs. Adams, 542 P2d 191, this Court
stated at 542 P2d 193:
"It is not the purpose of the su=ary judgment
procedure to judge the creditability of the averments
of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evid7nce.
Neither is it to deny parties th£• right to a tna~
to resolve disputed issues of fact.
Its purpose.is
to eliminate the time, trouble ancl expense of trial
when upon any view taken of the facts as ass~rted by.
the party ruled age inst, he would not be entitled
to prevail. Only when it so appears , is the co~rt
justified in refusing such a party the. opportunity de
of presenting his evidence and attempting ~o pursua
the fact trier to his views.
Conversely, if there
is any dispute as to any issue, material to the ,
settlement of the controversy, the summary judgmenshould not be granted".
.

The above announcement relating to the applica

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

b · 1; rv

l··-

I

of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not
constitute a new announcement by this Court as to the rules
governing disposition of proceedings filed pursuant to said
rule, but merely constitutes a reiteration of the established
guide lines.
683.

In re Williamses Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P2d

This Court has further stated that a Summary Judgment

is appropriate only where the favored party makes a showing which
precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the
losing party.

Tanner vs. Utah

Pou~try

and Farmers Co-op, 11 Utah

2d 353, 359 P2d 18, and Bullock vs. Deseret Dodge Truck Center,
Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P2d 559.
On review, this Court is, " ... obliged to com<ider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the (losing parties)".
Whitman vs. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P2d 918.
When viewed against the stamlard of appellate review,
it becomes apparent that respondent's standing as the proper
party plaintiff was a material fact as to which there was a
genuine dispute between the parties.

By his Verified Complaint,

respondent alleged that he had been assigned by agreement under
date of May 26, 1976, the seller's interest in and to the two
Purchase Agreements by and between O. J. Wilkinson and Seagull
(R.2); and, this allegation was renewed by respondent in his
Amended Complaint (R.71).

Appellants Seagull, Shirley K. Watson

and Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. alleged that they were
without sufficient information on which to form a belief as to
che truthfulness of respondent's allegation and, accordingly,
denied the same (R. 87; R. 99).
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Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires that "(e)very action shall be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest."

While an action may not be

dismissed until a reasonable time has been allowed for ratifk·
joinder or substitution, appellants submit that the standing

0:

the plaintiff as the real party in interest or successor in
interest to a contractural right or obligation constitutes a
significant material fact that a dispute with respect thi,reto
would preclude the grant of a Summary Judgment. In Disabled
American Veterans vs. Hendrickson, 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P2d 416,
plaintiff alleged that it was a duly authorized state chapter
of the Disabled American Veterans, a national organization, an:
as such, was vested with the rights granted to that corporatio:
By its answer, the defendant challenged plaintiff's capacity a;
a corporation in its right to sue.

In reiterating that Summar

Judgment, " ... can properly be rendered against a defendant oni
if, on the undisputed facts, the defendant has no valid defense
(9 Utah 2d 154), this Court held that the issue presented a
genuine dispu,te as to material issue of fact that precluded
Summary Judgment.
The materiality of this disputed issue of fact i;
emphasized by the uncontested consideration that prior to the
' 5 ~ r: I

purported assignment by Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson of his seller •·
· on
in and to the two Purchase Agreements to respondent herein ·

May 26, 1976, Mr. Wilkinson had executed and delivered to Zioc
· and cc
First National Bank a Deed of Trust and Assignment in
w' lkinso:
real property and the Purchase Agreement between Mr. i
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and Seagull.

Accordingly, as th{' same related to the real

property and the Purchase Agreement with respect thereto, Mr.
Wilkinson had no assignable interest in May of 1976.
A further complication presented by this issue is
wheth~r

Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson retained an assignable interest in

the agreement and remedies included therein, including forfeiture,
relating to the broadcasting license after the transfer from
Mr. Wilkinson to Seagull was approved by the Corrrrnission on the
13th day of December, 1974.

The Purchase Agreement relating to

the broadcasting license specifically provided, " ... that consummation of this deal shall be and is dependent upon the Buyer applying
for and obtaining approval from the FCC of the transfer of all
of seller's right, title, and interest in the FCC broadcast
license granted to seller," (R.18), and the record is clear that
Corrrrnission approval was granted(R.301).
Respondent has and continues to misconstrue the nature
of the broadcasting license duly issued and approved by the
Corrrrnission.

A license to broadcast is not a chattel or piece

of personal property that may be bought and sold subject to a
seller's security interest or lien.

Rather, the utilization of

the public airways is a privilege, the use of which is subject
to the exclusive regulation and control of the Corrrrnission.
This was recognized in American Broadcasting Company vs. F.C.C.'

191 F2d 493 (Ct of App., District of Columbia Circuit 1951),
wherein it was stated:
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','· .. it i~ well to emphasize certain fundamentals.
the policy of ~he (Communications) Act is clear
that no person is to have anything in the nature
o~ a pr~perty right as a result of the grant of a
license . F.C.C. vs. Sanders Brothers Radio
Station. 309 U.S. 7i7D, 475 s.ct.693, 697, 84
L Ed 869
II

This was further illustrated in F. L. Crowder vs. F.C
399 F2d 569 (Ct. of App. District of Columbia Circuit, 1968),
wherein it is stated at 399 F2d 571:

" ... a broadcast frequency is not a homestead which
after five years belongs to the settler for whatever
use he desires. Rather it belongs to the public
who through the Commission awards its use to a
license to operate consistent with the public
interest."
It is clear that when Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson conditionec
consummation of the trans fer of the broadcasting license to
Seagull on Connnission approval, Mr. Wilkinson relinquished,

b•:

operation of law, any security interest or lien in or to the
broadcasting license.

Having done so, Mr. Wilkinson could noc

subsequently assign to respondent an interest that he did not
have.
On further consideration illustrating thi' impropriet'
of allowing either Mr. Wilkinson or his purported successor ic
roadcarl
interest to invoke a remedy of forfeiture against the b
license is that under the subject agreement (R.15-21) an enfc:
.

t;'

able forfeiture releases the seller from any and all obllga ··
" ... to convey said property ... " (R.17).

In the context of th:

proceeding, O. J. Wilkinson assigned and transferred the bro:.
casting license to Seagull subject to approval by the Conuni;;
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I

I

When this approval was granted, the assignment and transfer were
accomplished and Mr. Wilkinson retained no further obligation
or interest to be conveyed and accordingly, could not assign an
enforceable forfeiture remedy.
Appellants respectfully submit that the issue relating
to respondent as the real party in interest together with the
issue of respondent's standing to obtain the relief requested
in the respondent's Amended Complaint constituted genuine disputes
as to material issues of fact that would in and of themselves
preclude Summary Judgment against appellant.
B.

NEITHER RESPONDENT NOR HIS PREDECESSOR IN
INTEREST PROPERLY INVOKED THE REMEDIAL
PROVISIONS OF THE SUBJECT PURCHASE AGREEMENTS.

The remedial provisions of both Purchase Agreements
including the agreement relating to the broadcasting equipment
and license, draw heavily in form and substance on the standard
form Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Each agreement provides for

a ninety (90) day grace period (R.10; R.17) and three alternative
remedies in the event of default, to wit: (1) Forfeiture if the
buyer fails to remedy the purported default within five days
after written notice from the seller; (2) Suit to recover
delinquent installments, including costs and attorney fees; and
(3) Upon written notice to the buyer, a treatment by the seller
of the agreement as a note and mortgage and foreclosure thereon
(R.10, 11; R.17).

In this proceeding, the lower Court by summary Judgment
declared that appellants had forfeited their interest in the
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real property, broadcasting equipment and other tangible perso:
property and the broadcasting license (R.172,173).

Appellants

respectfully submit that the lower Court erred in declaring a
forfeiture by appellants because a genuine dispute as to maten
fact existed as to whether respondent or his predecessor in
interest properly invoked the remedial requirements of the sub,
agreements.
There is no allegation in respondent's Amended Complai·
(R. 70-80) that respondent gave prior written notice to appella:

or any of them of an intent to declare a forfeiture.

The only

reference to a notice purportedly complying with the requiremec
of each Purchase Agreement is that Notic·e served on Gardner or.
the 4th day of September, 1975 (R. 358-362).

However, after th;

service of these documents and Gardner's departure for emplo~'
in Wyoming, Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson, the seller and individual res:I
for the service of the purported notices, represented and adv'.:
Gardner that Seagull would go forward with the subject Purchas:
Agreements.

Accordingly, Gardner returned to the stat ion and·

furthE;r notices were served by Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson.

Based on·

evidence, the lower Court should have found that a genuine di;:
as to material issue of fact existed, i.e. whE<ther Mr· 0. J.
Wilkinson by his conduct after the service of the purported
notice, waived any con tr<· ctural right to declare or proceed

w'.

forfeiture without the giving of another notice to appellants
. t while
Additionally, respondent's Amended Comp 1 ain •
·
.
.
d seagul'
alleging respondent's prEdecessor in interest serve
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with notices of forfeiture, further alleges that respondent
" ... has provided Seagull with written notice of (respondent's)
intention to treat the Agreement (relating to the real property)
as a note and mortgage and to foreclose the same". (R.72). This
allegation by respondent to the effect that respondent elected
to treat the agreement relating to the real property as a note
and mortgage and foreclose the same after the service of the
Notice relating to forfeiture, negates the prior forfeiture
notice an<l a Summary Judgment of forfeiture is inappropriate
because respondent has not complied with the Notice provisions
required to invoke that remedy.
The same is true of the agreement relating to the
broadcasting equipment and license.

The only notice referred to

by respondent is that served by respondent's predecessor in
interest in September'of 1974.

The factual issue relating to

a waiver of this notice by virtue of the subsequent conduct of
Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson has been previously discussed and it is
sufficient to note that appellants denied in their responsive
pleadings the receipt of any notice by respondent or his predecessor
in interest that would invoke the remedial provisions of the broadcasting equipment and license agreement.
After respondent's initial complaint (R.2-21) had been
filed October 12, 1976 and the Amended Complaint (R.70-80) filed
on the 13th day of July, 1977, respondent's legal counsel served
Gardner with a letter under date of September l, 1977 and attachments (R.

).

This letter attempted to invoke, on respondent's
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behalf, the forfeiture provisions of the subject agreements,
however, the same is totally defective for several reasons,
including the following:

(1) The purported notice was given

after the institution of the proceedings in the lower Court
wherein respondent sought forfeiture or, in the alternative,
foreclosure of mortgage;

(2) The purported notice is addresse.:

to Seagull and there is no verification of service on either :;:1
or Murray Broadcasting Co., Inc.;

(3) The purported notice fa:.

to advise the purchaser ttat unless the alleged default is rec:1
within five (5) days, the sellEr intends to be released from
all obligations to convey the property ancl that all previous i:1
will be forfeited;

(L.) The purported notice fails to advise

tn:

the purchaser has become a tenant at will of the seller; and,
(5) The purported notice reconfirms the earlier notice allegec.
given by respondent tc treat the agreements as a mortgage and
foreclose therEon.

For these reasons, the letter of Septembe:

1977, may not be used by respondent to pull himself by his 01~
bootstraps into compliance with the conditions precedent tot'•
invocation of the remedy of forfeiture.

As to a foreclosure

proceeding, the record is clear that no timely notice was se:•
on appellants prior to the institution of these proceedings.
It is clear that a genuine dispute as to a material''
of fact relating to respondent ' s compliance wi· th the remedial
the par::
conditiom. of the Purchase Agreements existed between
29 urah ·
As stated in Russell vs. Park City Utah Corporation,
184, 506 P2d 1274 (1973) of 506 P2d 1276:
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:1

:J

" ... one who seeks to invoke a forfeiture must
strictly comply with the prerequisites thereof
because forfeitures are not favored in the law.
It should be obvious that there is a disputed
material issue upon which the defendant is entitled
to a trial."
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY FORFEITED APPELLANTS'
INTEREST IN AND TO THE PRIOR PAYMENTS MADE PURSUANT
TO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENTS AND THIS ENFORCEMENT
AGAINST APPELLANTS CONSTITUTED AN UNCONSCIONABLE
PENALTY.
Respondent freely admits that appellants had paid to
respondent's predecessor in interest the

sumo~

$5,000.00 against

the real property agreement (R.73) together with the sum of
$74,000.00 against the broadcasting equipment and license

agreement (R.74).

However, by its Surmnary Judgment, the lower

Court forfeited appellants' interest in and to all amounts
previously paid.
A contractural provision providing for the seller's
retention of previously paid amounts may be enforceable as
liquidated damages or equitably unenforceable as a penalty depending
on whether the forfeited amount is reasonably related to the actual

damages sustained by the aggrieved party.
This Court stated in Russell vs. Ogden Union Ry. and
~ot Company, 122 Utah 107, 247 P2d 257 (1952) at 247 P2d 263:

"It is well settleod that a provision in a 7ontract
between private individuals for a penalty in case
of a breach of such contract is unenforceable in
the courts".
.
w;ll
not be enforced
Applying the principle t h at pena lt ies
~
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this Court, in Perkins et al vs. Spencer et al, 121 Utah 468,
243 P2d 446 (1952), stated at 121 Utah 474, 475:
"It will be observed that in all cases where the
~tipulation for liquidated damages was enforced
it bore some reasonable relation to the actual
damages which could reasonably be anticipated at
the time the contract was made and was not a
forfeiture which would allow an unconscionable
and exorbitant recovery.

" ... where enforcement of the forfeiture provision
would allow an unconscionable and exorbitant recover•:
bearing no reasonable relationship to the actual
,
damages suffered, we have uniformly held it to be
very unenforceable."
The agreement relating to the broadcasting equipment
and broadcast license provided that the first monthly installi:
payment after the payment of the amount of $74,000.00 was rek
and paid to Mr. Wilkinson by the escrow after Commission appro
of the subject transfer, would be the first day of the sixth
month following Conunission approval (R.15).

Accordingly, the

first installment was due on June 1, 1975; however, the agree::I
further provided for a ninety (90) day grace period within wh::
payment could be made after the same became due (R.17).

On
i

September 4, 1975, five days after the expiration of the gracei
period, Mr. Wilkinson served Seagull with the Notice purportin·
to invoke the forfeiture remedy of the subject agreement (R ·,l'

. 1 issu
.
e of fac
The existence of a genuine dispute as to materia
·ved ·
relating to whether Mr. Wilkinson's subsequent conduct wai
negated the notice of September 4, 1975, has been previouslY,
h

discussed and its present relevance is to illustrate t e
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inec~

of declaring a forfeiture of $74,000.00 by Seagull and its
successors in interest for a five day delinquency.
This Court may review both the facts and the law in
equity proceedings.

Article VII, Section 9 of the Constitution

of the State of Utah.

When so reviewed, it is clear that a

genuine dispute exists as to material issue of fact so as to
preclude a sununary judgment that forfeits appellants' prior
payments to respondent and his predecessor in interest.
POINT III
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECLARING A FORFEITURE OF
APPELLANTS' INTEREST IN AND TO THE BROADCASTING
LICENSE EXCEEDS THE SCOPE OF RELIEF DEMANDED IN
RESPONDENT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Respondent's Amended Complaint, while seeking a forfeiture
and/or mortgage foreclosure of the agreement relating to the real
property (R. 71-74),

trac~s

a different course with respect to

the agreement relating to the broadcasting equipment and broadcast
license.

With respect to the second agreement, respondent demands

"· .. a declaratory injunction determining plaintiff to be the
equitable owner of the license and equipment ... " and further, the
"· .. issuance of a mandatory injunction ... requiring defendants to
assist plaintiff in obtaining transfer of the F.C.C. license into
plaintiff's name" (R. 75); or, alternatively, for a judgment
treatment the agreement as a note and mortgage and foreclosing
the same (R. 76, 77); or, in the alternative, a judgment under
Article IX of the Utah Conunercial Code allowing respondent
~ssession

of the property, including the broadcasting license,

~d the sale thereof (R.77,78); or, in the alternative, an action
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under the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act (R.79).
Appellants submit that the Summary Judgment entered
by the lower Court exceeded the scope of the alternative relfr
sought by the respondent in his Amended Complaint to the surpr:
and prejudice of appellants.

In Taylor vs. E .M. Royle Corp.,

1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P2d 279 (1953), this Court stated at 264 Pi.

280:
"It is true that our new rules should be 'liberallv
construed' to secure a 'just·h'c7<determination of ·
every action' , but they do not represent a one way
street down which but one litigant may travel. The
rules allow locomotion in both directions by all
interested travelers.
They allow plaintiffs considerable latitude in pleading and proof, to the
point where some people have expressed the opinion
that careless legal craftsmanship has been invited
rather than discouraged. Be that as it may, a
defendant must be extended every reasonc:,ble opportuni
to prepare his case and to meet an adversary's claim:
Also he must be protected against surprise and be
assured equal opportunity and facility to present anc
prove counter contentions, --else unilateral justice
and injustice would result sufficient to raise seri~.
doubts as to constitutional due process guarantees.
This proceeding does not present a situation where a
party has been allowed to amend his pleadings to conform tot:
proof presented at a trial on the merits, rather, it is a
1

sunnnary judgment based on the pleadings.

In this latter sitU'

ot''... 1
·
the judgment should be within the scope of the plea d ings;
the judgment may be predicated on an issue a party was
upon to meet.

never)

· ·
In recognition
o f t h.is possi.ble adversity,RulE

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically limits the
·re··
judgment to the, " ... pleadings, depositions, answers to in-·
tories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavit;
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It is clear that with respect to the agreement relating
to the broadcasting equipment and broadcasting license, appellants
met and defended the issues as raised by respondent's Amended
Complaint.

By his Third Claim for Relief respondent sought a

declaratory injunction determining respondent to be the equitable
owner of the broadcast license and requiring appellants to assist
respondent in obtaining Commission approval of a transfer of the
license of appellants to respondent (R. 75).
In Radio Station WOW, Inc. vs. Johnson, 325 US 120,
89 L Ed 2092, The United States Supreme Court addressed itself
to the issue of the power of a state to adjudicate conflicting
claims to property used by a licensed radio station.

The Supreme

Court of the State of Nebraska had voided a lease of the physical
properties utilized by radio station on the grr·unds of fraud and
ordered the parties, "to do all things necessary" to secure a
return of the broadcast license to the defauded party.

The

United States Supreme Court concluded at 89 L Ed 2101:
" ... we think the court went outside its bounds when
it ordered the parties 'to do all things necessary'
to secure a return of the license".
It was further noted at 89 L Ed 2102:
"We think that State power is amply respecte~ ~f
it is qualified merely to the exten~ of reguiring
it to uphold execution of that por~ion of its ~ecree
requiring a retransfer of the physical.properties.
until steps are ordered to be taken, wit~ all delibe7ate
speed, to enable to Commission to deal with new application in connection with the station."
Subsequent holdings from other jurisdictions recognize
the separability of the jurisdiction of the state court to deal
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with the physical properties of the broadcast station as
distinquished from the broadcasting license issued by the
Commission to operate such a station.

In Big League Broadcas:

ing Company vs. Shedd-Agard Broadcasting, Inc. and Womack, L
So. 2d 247 (La. App., 1975), the court stated:
"We agree with that portion of the trial judges
reasoning recognizing that only the F.C.C. could
determine the validity of the license trc.nsfer
and that state courts are without jurisdiction in
that respect. However ... the F. C. C. 's jurisdiction
is limited merely to control of the license and ...
there can be a separation of the license from the
facility which that license gives one the privilege
of operating."
Additionally, in Southern Broadcasting CorporaEionvs
Carlson, 197 La. 823, 175 So. 587 (1937), the court stated:
"Of course, a state court could not, without approval
of the Communication Commission, order a transfer of
a license, or of any right granted thereunder."
It is well established that a state court may not
interfere with or compel the transfer of a duly issued and
approved broadcasting license and respondent's efforts to
accomplish this objective by a declaratory judgment were appr:
priately met and countered by appellants.

However, the entr:

of the Summary Judgment declaring appellants' interest in anc
to the broadcasting equipment and broadcast license forfeiteC
erroneously allowed respondent to accomplish indirectly what'
na:
could not accomplish directly to the prejudice of the appe
0
Had respondent pleaded a cause of action for forfeiture of
l

,.

agreement re la tint; to the equipment and license, appel an,,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

and would have properly presented their position to the lower
Court.
The grant of a sunnnary judgment that exceeded the scope
of the pleadings prejudically denied appellants the opportunity
to properly prepare and present their defenses and allowed a
disposition of the case on an issue defendants were never called
upon to meet.

Taylor vs. E. M. Royle Corp. supra.
POINT IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER, OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR SETTING OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND.
By its Order Appointing Receiver or in the Alternative
Setting Supersedeas Bond, under date of March 16, 1978, the lower
Court appointed a

receiv~r

of the real and persnonal property and

the broadcasting license that constituted the subject matter of
the proceeding.

Additionally, the order authorized the receiver

to sell said propr:rty, seek Connnission approval for the retransfer
of the broadcasting license from Murray Broadcasting Company,
Inc. to respondent or a third party purchaser obtained by the
receiver and, aut:horized the receiver to take over the management
of radio station KPRQ.
As previously noted, the real property and broadcast
equipment originally transferred by 0. J. Wilkinson to Seagull
are no longer being occupied or utilized by th~' present broadcasting license operator, Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc.

Accordingly,

~e appointment of a receiver with respect to these properties

would be unnecessary and inappropriate.

Respondent candidly concedes
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that:
" ( t) he reason why (respondent) seeks this receivershi:
is that (respondent) has been informed by co-counsel
in Washington D.C. specializing in FCC practice th~
FCC rules do not permit direct transfer of the FCC
license to plaintiff, and that such transfer can onl::
be accomplished by means of the appointment of a
receiver." (R.215).
Respondent predicated the appointment of a receiver i:
Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
in part:
"(a) receiver may be appointed by the court in which
an action is pending or has passed to judgment:

** *
"(3) After judgment, to carry the judgment into
effect."
However, it is clear that with respect to the real pF
and broadcasting equipment, a receiver was not necessary to c0:
the judgment into effect because the real property is no long:
occupied by appellants and the broadcasting equipment is w
longer utilized by appellants.

As the same relates to the

broadcasting license, a receiver is not necessary to carry

'.ht

summary judgment of forfeiture into effect because respondent
in his own name and on his own behalf, may apply to the Cammi'
for retransfer of the subject broadcasting license without
intervention of a third party receiver.

t[.,

For this reason aloni

the appointment of a post judgment receiver is not sanctioned
practical necessity or the applicable rules of civil procedur:
Additionally, the Order Appointing Receiver or
0
Al ternative, Setting Supersedeas Bon d , f ar exceeds the sc P'

,

the summary judgment of forfeiture in that the same allows a;..
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authorizes the receiver to assume the control and management of
radio station KPRQ.

There is no arguable premise on which it

may be argued that control and management of the radio station
itself is necessary to effectuate the sunnnary judgment of
forfeiture.

Respondent may apply to the Commission for approval

of an involuntary transfer of the broadcasting license from
Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. to respondent without the
necessity of assuming present control and management of the radio
station.

The operation of the station is pursuant to Commission

rules and regulations and violative conduct by the license holder
would render the license subject to revocation by the Commission.
See 47 USCA, Section 312.

There is nothing in the

r~cord

before

this Court to indicate or i~ply that continued management of the
station by Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. would jeopardize or
impair respondent's position and to now allow respondent the
operation and management of the station would far exceed the
scope of the summary judgment presently under appeal.
One final observation must be noted with respect to the
Order Appointing Receiver or in the Alternative, Setting S~persedeas
Bond.

While it appears that a state court may adjudicate certain

issues of private dispute relating to the physical properties of
an entity controled and licensed by the Commission, it is without
authority to invalidate an operating license or compel execution
against the same.

Radio Station WOW, Inc. vs. Johnson, supra.

The accomodation between the power of a state court as
against the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission, was further
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defined in RCA Communications, Inc. vs. Patchogue Broadcastin;
Company, 198 NYS 2d 459, reversed on other grounds at 204

ms

2d 900, as:
" ... an accomodation between a State and Federal
authority under which the State courts decree would
remain unexecuted until the license transfer is
properly accomplished, thus leaving with the State
the power to pass upon State issues involved in
Federal litigation without intruding on the Federal
issues."
It is well established that state court may not inter'.,
with or compel the transfer of a duly issued and approved
broadcasting license or authorize execution against the same,
and the lower Court improperly intruded into the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission.
CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully submit that the lower Court
erred in granting summary judgment of forfeiture ag<,inst
appellants, and that the above entitled matter should be
remanded to the District Court of the Third Judicial Distric'.
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for a full trial
on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of July, 1978.

GARY A. FRANK
uli
Attorney for Appellants, Seag
Enterprises, Inc. , Shirley ~
Watson and Murray Broadcasting
Company, Inc.
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